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Abstract: This paper explores the impact of introduction of the ‘None of the Above’ (NOTA) 
option in Indian legislative elections. NOTA was introduced as a ballot option following the 
Supreme Court ruling in 2013 based on the argument that more choices to voters will enhance 
voter participation. We take advantage of the state-time variation in introduction of NOTA 
option in state legislative assembly electionsin 2013 to study its impact on voter turnout. Using 
election data from five major Indian states between 2008 and 2013, we find evidences suggesting 
that NOTA may not have led to increased voter participation. However, our results are not 
conclusive. 
 
Introduction 
In July 2013, the Supreme Court of India, in response to a public interest litigation (PIL) filed by 
the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), ruled that voters should be given the choice to 
reject all candidates who are competing for being elected in their respective constituencies. 
Based on the perception that more voting choices will likely result in higher voter turnout, the 
Supreme Court,accordingly directed the Election Commission of India to include the option 
“None of the Above” (also popularly known as NOTA) in the electronic voting machines and 
ballot papers.The Supreme Court asserted that NOTA will specifically encourage those voters to 
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cast their ballots, who otherwise would not vote because they were not satisfied with any of the 
candidates contesting in the election. The Supreme Court furthernoted that the NOTA option 
might alsoaid in cleansing the Indian political system to some extent. According to the then 
Chief Justice of India, P Sathasivam, “Negative voting will lead to a systemic change in polls 
and political parties will be forced to project clean candidates. If the right to vote is a statutory 
right, then the right to reject a candidate is a fundamental right of speech and expression under 
the Constitution."(Chauhan 2013). Thus by exercising NOTA option, the electorate can send a 
strong message to the political parties that some people are unhappy with the parties’ choice of 
nominatedcandidates. This,in turn, can be expected to put immense moral pressure on political 
parties for fieldingonly those candidates who are generally more acceptable to the electorate. 
Moreover, empoweringvoters with the option of rejecting all candidates would also likely lead to 
a “systemic change” in the entire electoral process.  
Besides the mere logical anticipations following the introduction of the NOTA option, NOTA 
should undoubtedly have profound theoretical and practical implications in the realm of social 
choice and voting procedure. Following the July 2013 decision by the apex court, NOTA option 
appeared first in state legislative elections held during the second half of 2013. Major states 
where NOTA was implemented in 2013 were Delhi, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and 
Chhattisgarh. Compared to 2008 state legislative elections, in 2013 voter turnout in these states 
increased by an average of 6.79 percentage points. The increase in voter turnout ranged from 
2.97 percentage pointsin Madhya Pradesh to 9.18 percentage points in Rajasthan. Despite the 
substantial increase in voter turnout in 2013 elections following the implementation of the 
NOTA option, all of thisincrease cannot be purely attributed to the introduction of NOTA alone. 
Over time, India has experienced wide variations in voter participation. Voter turnout as 
percentage of eligible voters in national elections have ranged between 55%and 70% since the 
first general elections of 1952. In the state of Karnataka, where state legislative elections were 
held during the first half of 2013 prior to the introduction of NOTA, a 6.23 percentage point 
increase in voter turnout was observed compared to the 2008 elections. Hence it is reasonableto 
comprehend that there can be amyriad of factors besides NOTA that might have caused the 
significant increase in voter turnout in 2013 compared to the 2008 elections.  
The legislative elections held in the states of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Karnataka, Delhi and 
Chhattisgarh during 2008 and 2013 present us witha unique opportunity to test the hypothesis 
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whether voter turnout really increased due to the introduction of NOTA in 2013. In 2008, all the 
above mentioned states had state legislative elections without NOTA option while in 2013 these 
states exceptKarnataka incorporatedNOTA in their election ballots. Since the Supreme Court 
decision regarding NOTA was not influenced by the upcoming state elections, we can safely 
assume that states where NOTA was implemented were randomly chosen. Hence, byexploiting 
the variation in the timing of the reform, we use a differences-in-difference methodology to test 
the hypothesis whether NOTA increased voter turnout in state legislative elections. The 
remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Related literature, although very scarce, will be 
discussed in the next section. In the following section we overview the data and present some 
descriptive statistics.Then we report and discuss our empirical findings. Final sectionconcludes 
the paper.  
 
Related Literature and Contextualization of the Issue 
According to Fiorina and Shepsley(1989), “Negative voting occurs when voters respond more 
strongly to political actions or outcomes that they oppose than to comparable actions or 
outcomes they favor”. Therefore, NOTA can be viewed as an instance of negative voting since it 
is a vote of disapproval. This disapproval can be a reflection of public discontent with both the 
choice of contesting candidates as well as the political parties’advocated policies. The general 
theory predicts that a negative voting option would give disgruntled voters an opportunity to 
demonstrate their dissatisfaction and hence will naturally increase electoral participation. In the 
case of NOTA, higher voter dissatisfaction might also induce political parties reconsider their 
choice of candidates and this eventually will bring more accountability in the overall electoral 
process.  
Existing academic literature exploring the linkage between negative voting and voter 
participation is extremely rare. Katju (2013) examines electoral participation by investigating 
voter turnout figures in countries which have the option of negative voting. In Sweden where 
voters have the option of casting a negative vote in form of a blank vote, voter turnouts have 
been as high as 85%, whereas the blank vote countshave remained around less than 1%. Greece 
and Brazil, both countries with the provision of casting negative votes also report high voter 
turnouts, but unlike Sweden, they both implement a system of compulsory voting. The first 
general electionsheld in Bangladeshwith the no vote option in 2008 witnessed a significant 
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increase in voter turnout. Although the voter turnout figures in Bangladesh reached a staggering 
78.93% mark, the no vote figure failed to merely cross 1%. 
 
Prior research documenting electoral participation in India and analyzing its underlying patterns 
is limited. Diwakar (2008) studied the factors determining voter turnout in Indian general 
elections over the period 1951 to 2004. She finds turnout tends to be higher in states with higher 
literacy rates and in instances where elections are closely fought. In addition, both a larger 
electorate and states with a higher proportion of urban population correspond to lower turnout 
percentages.The author asserts that her findings are consistent with the established “rational-
voter model1”, according to which the chance of casting the pivotal vote that can affect anoverall 
electoral outcome is extremely miniscule from an individual voter’s perspective. Yadav (2000) 
disaggregates voter turnout statistics in India in terms of regions and prominent social groups to 
understand the changing nature of political participation among Indian voters in the 1990s. 
Yadav’s key thesis is that although overall turnout figures have not increased dramatically (in the 
1990s), the composition of those who vote has undergone a major change. In particular, the 
author notes that there is a democratic upsurge among the socially underprivileged groups – the 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, while the increase in participation rates has not been 
observed in some other disadvantaged groups, for instance Muslims and women. McMillan 
(2005) focusses on the effect of electoral reservation of constituencies for candidates from 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes on voter turnout. He uses evidence from survey data to 
conclude that although voters in Scheduled Tribe constituencies are less likely to vote, there is no 
clear indication that Scheduled Tribes themselves vote significantly differently to other voters. 
He reports similar results for Scheduled Caste constituencies and finds that electoral reservation 
has little impact on turnout behavior of members of the Scheduled Castes. Furthermore, turnout 
in reserved and general seats have shown a clear pattern of convergence over time. 
 
To the best of our knowledge,Chatterjee et al. (2016) is the only study which studies the impact 
NOTA on voter turnout rates in India. Specifically, the authors use consumption utility models of 
voting found evidences that NOTA increasedvoting. Their study indicates that substitution from 
                                                          
1The “rational-votermodel” is due to Downs (1957) which contends that for an individual voter, the costsassociated 
with voting exceed the expected benefits.  
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candidate votes to NOTA is minimal. Instead, most NOTA votes are cast by new voters who turn 
out to vote specifically for this option.  
 
 
Assembly Elections in India – A Background 
India is a federal parliamentary democratic republic in which the President of India is the head of 
state and the Prime Minister of India is the head of government. India follows the dual polity 
system, i.e. a double government which consists of the central authority at the center and the 
states at the periphery. The constitution defines the organization, powers and limitations of both 
central and state governments, and it is well-recognized, rigid and considered supreme; i.e. laws 
of the nation must conform to it. The governments, union or state, are formed through elections 
held every five years (unless otherwise specified), by parties that claim a majority of members in 
their respective lower houses (Lok Sabha in center and Vidhan Sabha in states). The party or 
coalition that wins the mostnumber of seats in an assembly forms the state government headed 
by a Chief Minister andhis council of ministers. In 2013, 8 out of the 29 Indian states and the 
National CapitalTerritory of Delhi held assembly elections, in different months.All elections in 
India are conducted by the Election Commission of India under thesupervision of the chief 
election commissioner. Since independence, the Commission hasemerged as a highly regarded 
institution with a large degree of autonomy (McMillan, 2010). 
 
India follows a quota based affirmative action policy called “Reservation”. Scheduled Castes 
(SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST) and Other Backward Classes (OBC), and in some states Backward 
Classes among Muslims under a category called BC(M), are the primary beneficiaries of the 
reservation policies under the Constitution – with the objective of ensuring a fair inclusiveness in 
the society. In the system of political reservation, some constituencies are also designated as 
Scheduled Caste(SC) and some as Scheduled Tribe (ST), in which only candidates from these 
given castes can runfor office. However, to win, they must still obtain a plurality of all votes 
regardless of voter’scaste. The reservedstatus of SC and ST constituencies is set at the same time 
as the electoral boundaries aredrawn. The current electoral constituencies were set in April 2008 
by a delimitation commission working under the Election Commission.  
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Participation rates in Indian elections tend to be high. In our state election data for 2008average 
turnout was 68% and only 3% of the constituencies had turnout lower than 50%. 
 
 
Empirical Strategy 
Our goal is to estimate the effects of NOTA on voter participation as measured by percentage of 
votes polled. One straightforward way to achieve this is to compare the change in mean 
percentage of votes polledbetween pre and post NOTA periods– for states impacted by NOTA 
with the potential mean changes in percentage of votes polled if they were not affected by 
NOTA. Since it is not possible to observe how voting would have evolved without NOTA, we 
exploit the unequal effects of NOTA by including those states where NOTA was not 
implemented in the comparison set but still resemble the counterfactual scenario as closely as 
possible. Following standard program evaluation literature, we postulate two states of nature: one 
where percentage of votes polled is not affected by the introduction of NOTA and the other in 
which NOTA affected the percentage of votes polled. We then estimate the effect of NOTA on 
votes polled by comparing the changes in percentage of votes polled between these two 
competitive states. To quantify the change that results from the introduction of NOTA, we apply 
a difference-in-differences (DID hereafter) approach. The principle of a DID analysis is based 
upon the comparison of the average effect of a treatment (here the states with NOTA) on an 
outcome (here the percentage of votes polled), between two groups: the treatment group that 
includes subjects exposed to the treatment (T = 1) and the complementary group, called the 
control group, that includes subjects unexposed to the treatment (T = 0). Let Yit(0) be the 
percentage of votes polled in state i at time t in a non-treated state and Yit(1) be the percentage of 
votes polled under treatment, respectively. The average treatment effect (ATE) to be estimated 
can be expressed as E[Yit1(1) - Yit0(1)|T=1] - E[Yit1(0) - Yit0(0)|T=0] where t0 and t1 are the pre 
and post treatment times, respectively. The simple estimate of the average treatment effect is 
derived by computing an unconditional difference-in-differences. The key identification 
assumption here is that, in the absence of NOTA, the percentage of votes polled would have 
evolved identically between the two groups. 
Data and descriptive analysis 
7 
 
Our main data source is the Election Commission of India. Poll data for 2008 and 2013 state 
assembly elections are collected for each constituency in Karnataka, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, 
Delhi and Chhattisgarh2. Primary variables of interest are – voter turnout measured by number of 
actual votes as percentage of the total eligible voting population in a constituency reported for a 
particular election, reservation status of the constituency (e.g. SC, ST or General)and votes 
polled under NOTA.  
Figure 1 shows the histogram of voter turnout across districts over the two assembly elections 
between 2008 and 2013. The curve shown represents kernel density, which resembles a normal 
distribution in this case thus implying a well-spread-out distribution around the mean. There is a 
large concentration of points between 60% and 80%, with the mean and median valueslying 
around 70% and 71.5%, respectively.  
Panel A in Figure 2 shows a box plot of voter turnout trends across constituencies in 2008 and 
2013 state legislativeelections. Each box represents the turnout in a particular election year at the 
constituency level, and also shows the range of inter-constituency variation in that particular 
year. The boxes are drawn in a manner that their lower and the upper bounds represent the 25th 
and 75th percentile values of the distribution respectively within a particular year. Similarly, the 
upper and lower bounds of the two whiskers represent almost the whole distribution, while the 
points outside the whiskers show the outliers. The line drawn inside each box shows the median 
turnout in a particular election. It is evident from Panel A in Figure 2 that turnoutclearly varied 
across the constituencies. Panel A also depicts that across all states, votes polled is substantially 
higher is 2013 compared to 2008. In 2013, average votes polled was 73.5% across all five states 
considered in this paper, whereas, in 2008 it was 67%. Votes polled also varied largely across 
states, as can be seen from Table 1 where we present summary statistics of voter turnout by state. 
In 2013, the polling rate was 77.5% in Chhattisgarh compared to 57.8% in Delhi. Except for 
Delhi, voterturnout also tends to be lower in constituencies reserved for SC compared to General 
or ST category. Panel B in Figure 2 shows the box plot for voter turnout across states.  
 
During the 2013 legislative elections in the states of Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh 
and Delhi, about 1.4% of total votes polled were for NOTA. However, this number varied widely 
                                                          
2
 In 2013, state legislative elections also took place in the states of Tripura, Meghalaya and Nagaland. We left out 
these states since almost all the seats in these states are reserved for Scheduled Tribes.  
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across states ranging from 0.6% in Delhi to 3.1 % in Chhattisgarh (see Panel C in Figure 2). It is 
also visible that within states, share of votes polled for NOTA is higher in constituencies 
reserved for SC/ST compared to general constituencies (see Panel D in Figure 2 and Figure 3).  
For example, in Chhattisgarh, share of votes polled under NOTA in SC and ST reserved 
constituencies were 2.75% and 4.71% respectively, compared to 2.38% in general constituencies. 
In contrast in Delhi, which is an urban area, only 0.61% of votes polled for NOTA were in 
general constituencies and 0.78% were cast in constituencies reserved for SC. It is to be noted 
that Delhi does not have any constituency reserved for ST category. 
The primary purpose of having a NOTA option in the ballot was to give more choices to the 
voter, which in turn was expected to increase voter participation in the electoral process. Though 
share of votes polled increased substantially across all the state elections where NOTA was 
introduced, however, it is not conclusive that the increase was primarily driven by the 
introduction of the NOTA option.  
Econometric analysis 
In order to decipher the impact of NOTA on voting, we will exploit a policy break in the 
introduction of NOTA during the 2013 legislative elections. Following the Supreme Court 
judgement, NOTA was introduced in September 2013 for elections in the states of Delhi, 
Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. However, in May 2013, state legislative election 
was conducted in Karnataka when NOTA option was not implemented. This break in policy 
introduction allows us to make use of a natural experiment scenario with Delhi, Chhattisgarh, 
Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan being the treatment group and Karnataka as the control, a crucial 
underlying assumption being that Karnataka represents a good control group for our experiment.  
Among the states under study, Delhi and Chhattisgarh have smaller population compared to the 
other states. Delhi also has an extremely small rural population and negligible Scheduled Tribe 
population. This is expected since Delhi is primarily an urban city which was declared a separate 
state only in 1993. Delhi also has the highest per capita income that is larger by a factor of 3-4 
compared to the other states considered in this study. Apart from Delhi, all the other states are 
similar in terms of demography and economy. To ensure the robustness of our results, we will 
estimate our econometric model using different combination of states. However, Karnataka will 
remain our only control state. 
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For the DID estimator to identify and consistently estimate the average effect, one may assume 
that assignment to treatment is independent of the outcome. Based on natural-experiment 
terminology, this means that assignment to the treatment group is not confounded with the 
outcome (also known as the unconfoundedness assumption, see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
This estimate will be biased if factors that could affect outcome variables vary significantly 
across the treated and the comparison groups. For our particular case, the unconfoundedness 
assumption is easy to sustain since the treatment assignment is random. The Supreme Court 
decision to implement NOTA came after the Karnataka election and these two events are not 
related. According to standard DID approach, the effects of NOTA on votes polled is 
approximated by the following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
 =  + 	
 + 	
 + 	
  ×  	
 + 
 +  
where Yitis the percentage of voter turnout in state i in time period t, PostNOTAtis a dummy 
variable that identifies post NOTA period, i.e. PostNOTAt=1 if year is 2013 and 0 otherwise. 
NOTAiis a dummy variable such that NOTAi =1 if state i belongs to the treatment group. The 
average effect of introduction of NOTA is captured through the coefficient vector . In 
addition, we have a set of control variables Zit.  
Results 
Our main results are reported in Table 3. The dependent variable is the percentage of votes 
polled in state i in time period t and the explanatory variables are a set of dummy variables. We 
have included a dummy variable Reservedit which takes value 1 if a particular seat is reserved for 
SC/ST. We have also interacted this dummy variable with PostNOTAtand NOTAi to tease out any 
possible interaction effects. Our parameter of interest is coefficient  associated with the 
variable NOTAix PostNOTAt(this variable takes value 1 if a particular state is part of the 
treatment group and the period is 2013) that isolates the effect of NOTA on percentage of votes 
polled.  
Multiple model specifications are tested and the results are presented in columns (1) – (4) of 
Table 3. In all model specifications, our coefficient of interest turned out to be negative but 
insignificant. The variables PostNOTAt(which captures the time period when NOTA was 
implemented i.e. 2013) turned out to be significant and positive. This is expected since there was 
a significant increase in voter turnout in 2013 state legislative elections compared to 2008 
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elections. The variable NOTAi (which captures if a state had NOTA implemented) turned out to 
be positive but insignificant. Based on the regression estimates it seems that NOTA overall had 
no significant impact on voter turnout. Our results remained consistent even after inclusion of 
reservation dummies and various interactions with reservation dummies. Though the coefficient 
of the Reservation dummy (Reservedit) turned out to be negative, but the coefficients remained 
insignificant in all model specifications. It seems that voter turnout in the reserved constituencies 
were not significantly different from the non-reserved constituencies. Based on our estimation 
results, we find that compared to our control state Karnataka, introduction of NOTA has no 
significant impact on percentage of votes polled. This clearly cuts into the argument that NOTA 
is expected to increase voter turnout.  
Our results in Table 3 may be biased by the fact that we are dealing with extreme differences in 
the nature of states under consideration. For example, demographics and history of each state 
under consideration are significantly different. Hence, we decided to compare each of the states 
where NOTA was implemented individually with Karnataka. Tables 4 – 7 shows our estimation 
resultscomparing Karnataka with each of the four states separately.  
 
Results in Tables 4 – 7 varies considerably from state to state. Again our coefficient of interest is 
the one associated with the variable NOTAix PostNOTAt. Results in Rajasthan and Delhi (Tables 
6 and 7) show evidences which supports the idea that NOTA increased voter participation. 
Whereas in Madhya Pradesh (Table 4) we find evidences which rejects the positive association 
between NOTA and voter participation. Rather we find that NOTA might have discouraged 
people to cast their votes. In Chhattisgarh we find no significant positive or negative relationship 
between NOTA and voter participation.  
Results presented in the analysis above are definitely not conclusive. Though overall we find no 
evidence that NOTA might have increased voter participation, however, individual state level 
analysis shows mixed outcomes. In some states NOTA had significant positive effects on voter 
turnout, whereas we have evidences which suggested otherwise where NOTA had no or in some 
cases negative impact on voter participation outcomes.  
Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to test the impact of the introduction on NOTA on voter 
participation. Though NOTA was introduced with the intention of increasing voter participation, 
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we find evidences using data from legislative assembly elections in five states suggesting that the 
NOTA may not have any significant impact on voter participation. Though available data 
definitely is not sufficient to draw any definitive conclusions, however, we also do not find any 
definitive evidence of the positive impact of NOTA on voter participation. Moreover, our results 
varied across states when each states were compared individually with our control state 
Karnataka. Finally, questions can be raised about the validity of Karnataka as a good control due 
to wide cultural and socio-economic differences across states in India.  
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Fig 1: Histogram of Voter Turnout 2008-2013 
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Fig 2: Box Plots of Voter Turnout and NOTA votes  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 3: Box plot of NOTA by state and category 
Panel A: Box plot of voter turnout across constituencies between 
2008 and 2013 
Panel B: Box plot of voter turnout across constituencies by state 
Panel C: Box plot of NOTA by state Panel D: Box plot of NOTA by category 
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Table 2: Key Characteristics of states under study 
Year Gen SC ST Total 
 Chhattisgarh 
2008 70.90% 69.66% 70.40% 70.60% 
2013 77.03% 76.76% 78.86% 77.59% 
 Delhi 
2008 57.49% 59.30% 0.00% 57.81% 
2013 66.00% 67.70% 0.00% 66.29% 
 Karnataka 
2008 66.89% 64.20% 65.64% 66.37% 
2013 72.53% 72.67% 73.38% 72.61% 
 Madhya Pradesh 
2008 70.25% 67.67% 70.81% 69.97% 
2013 72.93% 71.42% 74.12% 72.94% 
 Rajasthan 
2008 67.49% 62.60% 66.97% 66.62% 
2013 76.33% 73.72% 75.56% 75.81% 
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State 
Population 
(2011Census) 
(million) 
Per capita 
Income 
(2011) 
(Rs.) 
Number of 
Constituencies 
Share of SC 
Population 
Share of ST 
Population 
Rural 
Population 
(million) 
Urban 
Population 
(million) 
Karnataka 61.3 68,053 448 16.5% 7% 61.3% 38.7% 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
72.5 37,979 460 15.6% 21.1% 72.3% 27.7% 
Chhattisgarh 25.5 48,366 180 12.8% 30.6% 76.7% 23.3% 
Rajasthan 68.6 52,735 400 17.8% 13.5% 75.1% 24.9% 
Delhi 16.8 166,883 138 16.9% - 2.5% 97.5% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Overall impact of NOTA on voter turnout 
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Variable 1 2 3 4 
NOTAi x 
PostNOTAt 
0.0010789 
(0.0104819) 
0.0010789 
(0.0104846) 
0.0000626 
(0.0104091) 
0.0051598 
(0.0125078) 
PostNOTAt 
0.062333* 
(0.0095326) 
0.062333* 
(0.0095349) 
0.0599377* 
(0.0099404) 
0.0563848* 
(0.0113683) 
NOTAi 
0.0113216 
(0.0080203) 
0.0113653 
(0.0079997) 
0.0089012 
(0.0086938) 
0.0063526 
(0.009527) 
Constant 0.6637294* (0.0073324)  
0.6638324* 
(0.0074713) 
0.6671018 * 
(0.0081264) 
0.6688783* 
(0.0086932) 
Reservedit  
   -0.0004526 
(0.0043169) 
-0.0148122 
(0.0112529) 
-0.0226147 
(0.0154254) 
Reservedit x 
PostNOTAt 
  
0.0105206 
(0.0086226) 
0.0261255 
(0.0197862) 
Reservedit x 
PostNOTAt 
  
0.0118763 
(0.0109863) 
0.02206 
(0.016966) 
Reservedit x 
PostNOTAt x 
PostNOTAt 
   
-0.0203674 
(0.0219453) 
R2 0.1302 0.1302 0.1316 0.1321 
Observations 1626 1626 1626 1626 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *=0.01, **=0.05, ***=0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Impact of NOTA on voter turnoutin Madhya Pradesh 
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Variable 1  2 3 4 
NOTAi x 
PostNOTAt 
-0.032609* 
(0.0115901) 
 
-0.032609* 
(0.0115904) 
-0.0346506* 
(0.0114907) 
-0.0295742** 
(0.0140238) 
PostNOTAt 
0.062333* 
(0.0095419) 
 
0.062333* 
(0.0095406) 
0.0587253* 
(0.0102831) 
0.0563848* 
(0.0113906) 
NOTAi 
.0359813*     
(0.0087546) 
 
0.0367818* 
(0.0087083) 
0.0361538* 
(0.0095456) 
0.0336156* 
(0.0105298) 
Constant 0.6637294* (0.0073396) 
 
0.665144*  
(0.007583) 
0.667708* 
(0.0082699) 
0.6688783* 
(0.0087102) 
Reservedit  
 
-0.0062131 
(0.0058028) 
-0.0174747 
(0.0122459) 
-0.0226147 
(0.0154557) 
Reservedit x 
PostNOTAt 
 
 
 
0.0158455 
(0.0115875) 
0.0261255 
(0.019825) 
Reservedit x 
PostNOTAt 
 
 
 
0.0058312 
(0.0120795) 
0.0148081 
(0.0184207) 
Reservedit x 
PostNOTAt x 
PostNOTAt 
 
 
  
-0.0179538 
(0.0241556) 
R2 0.0838 
 
0.0848 0.0865 0.0870 
Observations 908 
 
908 908 908 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *=0.01, **=0.05, ***=0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5:Impact of NOTA on voter turnoutin Chhattisgarh 
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Variable 1 2 3 4 
NOTAi x 
PostNOTAt 
0.0075357 
(0.015564) 
0.0075357 
(0.0155827) 
0.0026299 
(0.0150863) 
0.0049007   
(0.0179248) 
PostNOTAt 
0.062333* 
(0.0095514) 
0.062333* 
(0.0095532) 
0.0569018* 
(0.0107652) 
0.0563848*   
(0.0114132) 
NOTAi 
0.042281* 
(0.0115528) 
0.0433176* 
(0.0113378) 
0.0412591* 
(0.0118966) 
0.0401236*   
(0.0129449) 
Constant 0.6637294* (0.0073468) 
0.664877* 
(0.0077562) 
0.6686197* 
(0.008462) 
0.6688783*   
(0.0087275) 
Reservedit  
-0.0050405 
(0.0079017) 
-0.0214793 
(0.0137019) 
-0.0226147   
(0.0154864) 
Reservedit x 
PostNOTAt 
  
0.0238547   
(0.0157535) 
0.0261255   
(0.0198644) 
Reservedit x 
PostNOTAt 
  
0.012552   
(0.0163064) 
0.0157111   
(0.0245006) 
Reservedit x 
PostNOTAt x 
PostNOTAt 
   
-0.0063181    
(0.032637) 
R2 0.1386 0.1390 0.1423 0.1424 
Observations 628 628 628 628 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *=0.01, **=0.05, ***=0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6:Impact of NOTA on voter turnoutin Rajasthan 
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Variable 1 2 3 4 
NOTAi x 
PostNOTAt 
0.029511** 
(0.0112746) 
0.029511**   
(0.0112298) 
0.028337**   
(0.0111383) 
0.032018** 
(0.0133942) 
PostNOTAt 
0.062333*   
(0.0095434) 
0.062333*   
(0.0095462) 
0.0580442*   
(0.0103486) 
0.0563848*   
(0.0113942) 
NOTAi 
0.0024876   
(0.0086614) 
0.0035484   
(0.0085741) 
0.0079073    
(0.009353) 
0.0060668   
(0.0102683) 
Constant 0.6637294   (0.0073407) 
0.6676045*   
(0.0075992) 
0.6680486*   
(0.0083008) 
0.6688783*   
(0.0087129) 
Reservedit  
-0.0170202**   
(0.0058957) 
-0.0189706   
(0.0123865) 
-0.0226147   
(0.0154605) 
Reservedit x 
PostNOTAt 
  
0.0188373   
(0.0117377) 
0.0261255   
(0.0198312) 
Reservedit x 
PostNOTAt 
  
-0.0146117    
(0.011841) 
-0.007482    
(0.018245) 
Reservedit x 
PostNOTAt x 
PostNOTAt 
   
-0.0142593   
(0.0236846) 
R2 0.1832 0.1895 0.1927 0.1929 
Observations 848 848 848 848 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *=0.01, **=0.05, ***=0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Impact of NOTA on voter turnoutin Delhi 
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Variable 1 2 3 4 
NOTAi x 
PostNOTAt 
0.0225376**   
(0.010993) 
0.0225376**   
(0.0110287) 
0.0236485**   
(0.0111584) 
0.0286683**   
(0.0128498) 
PostNOTAt 
0.062333*   
(0.0095536) 
0.062333*   
(0.0095567) 
0.0576288*  
(0.0109317) 
0.0563848*   
(0.0114185) 
NOTAi 
-0.0856537*    
(0.008468) 
-0.0858746*   
(0.0085518) 
-0.0914302*   
(0.0092043) 
-0.0939401*   
(0.0098861) 
Constant 0.6637294*   (0.0073485) 
0.664665*   
(0.0078187) 
0.6682562*   
(0.0085405) 
0.6688783*   
(0.0087315) 
Reservedit  
-0.0041093   
(0.0081214) 
-0.0198827   
(0.0140568) 
-0.0226147   
(0.0154935) 
Reservedit x 
PostNOTAt 
  
0.0206616   
(0.0161279) 
0.0261255   
(0.0198736) 
Reservedit x 
PostNOTAt 
  
0.0270685**   
(0.0122529) 
0.0406557**   
(0.0185287) 
Reservedit x 
PostNOTAt x 
PostNOTAt 
   
-0.0271744   
(0.0242421) 
R2 0.2128 0.2131 0.2168 0.2173 
Observations 586 586 586 586 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *=0.01, **=0.05, ***=0.1 
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